

STEPS BEING TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES AND THE OTHER AMERICAN REPUBLICS TO MEET THE COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE OFFENSIVE IN THE HEMISPHERE: Statement Made by the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Martin) Before the Latin American Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, February 18, 1963 (Excerpts)<sup>a</sup>

In the face of the Communist subversive offensive in the hemisphere, there arises the question of what the U.S. and the other American Republics are doing to meet it. Success in combating this offensive will, of course, depend greatly on the will and ability of all the American governments to act and to coordinate their efforts with each other. It is important to keep in mind that what we are concerned with are problems and situations which exist in 19 independent, sovereign nations, as properly jealous of their independence as we are. Although we are interdependent and allied by geography, common origins, and the regional security system of the OAS [Organization of American States], we are all also firmly committed in inter-American treaties to the principle of non-intervention in each other's internal affairs.

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<sup>a</sup> Text in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962*, pp. 320-331.

<sup>b</sup> For text of address, see *ante*, doc. I-3.

<sup>c</sup> Text as printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, Mar. 18, 1963, pp. 404-412. The first part of this statement, primarily concerned with the development and changing tactics of Communism in Latin America, appeared in the Department of State *Bulletin*, Mar. 11, 1963, pp. 347-356.

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Indeed, the violation of this principle by the Soviet and Castro-directed Communists creates the problem we are talking about.

From this it is evident that, so far as the U.S. is concerned, neither the problem nor the remedies are entirely within our control. It means that the steps the U.S. takes must be in full agreement, free cooperation, and partnership with our Latin American allies. While promoting increasing cooperation, the U.S., in all its efforts, continues to respect the principle of sovereign independence. We cannot and will not ourselves, in combating violation of this principle by others, destroy the very principle we are trying to preserve.

We are channeling our direct attack on the problem of Communist subversion in two directions. One is to isolate Cuba from the hemisphere and discredit the image of the Cuban revolution in the hemisphere. The other is to improve the internal security capabilities of the countries concerned.

Even more important over the long term will be the achievement of our goals under the Alliance for Progress, a partnership of 20 countries of the inter-American system.

A number of U.S. agencies are engaged in implementing programs designed to assist the governments of Latin America to deal with this insidious threat. Their individual activities are carried on as a part of an integrated U.S. effort to strengthen country internal security capabilities and to promote sound political, economic, and social structures through democratic processes. Each of the representatives of the other agencies at this hearing will be able to furnish you in more detail information about their efforts and the achievement of these objectives.

Coordination of all of these activities takes place in the weekly meetings of the Latin American Policy Committee. In these meetings, senior policy officials of all the concerned agencies meet with me to discuss their programs on the basis of prepared staff papers. We examine in some detail the activities of each of the agencies in the area at each weekly meeting and agree on programs for periods in the future ranging from 6 months to a number of years, depending on our ability to foresee what is needed.

If the conclusions of the Latin American Policy Committee are such as to require higher level decisions, they are promptly submitted to higher authority for review and approval, including, where appropriate, the President.

These policy and program decisions are then carried out as an integrated effort by the country team in the field and by day-to-day dialog between the country desk officers of the various agencies here in Washington.

Between meetings there is, of course, continuing and frequent informal contact at all levels between the concerned agencies.

While subversion has been, as we have seen, a long-term effort, its strength is unquestionably affected by the position, prestige, and stability of Castro and his regime in Cuba. We have had a considerable measure of success from our efforts to isolate Cuba and discredit the Castro government. In this regard, the missile crisis proved to be of

inestimable value in unmasking the Castro regime, previously regarded by many as a model for a new Latin American-type revolution, as just one more tool of Moscow. The ineptitude of Cuban leaders, coupled with the success of our efforts to deprive Cuba of access to the industrialized markets of the free world, has brought about serious economic deterioration in the island.

In the political field a major reduction in the influence of *fidelismo* in the hemisphere has been achieved. The Castro government has been suspended from participation in the OAS. Fifteen American Republics no longer have diplomatic relations with Cuba. Last October during the missile crisis the American Republics achieved complete hemispheric solidarity on OAS action to protect the peace and security of the continent.<sup>10</sup> As a result of economic deterioration, Soviet domination, and political ostracism, the Cuban example has become increasingly less attractive to Latin American peoples.

The facts about what Castro has done to Cuba and its people need only to be known in order to convince. Our copy is readymade for us, but it must be gotten to the millions in every Latin American country, nearly half of them illiterate. USIA [U.S. Information Agency] is waging a battle for men's minds in telling this story of the betrayal of the Cuban revolution and what conditions in Cuba and other Communist countries are like today. Through radio, press, books, television, and films, this message is being carried daily to the Latin American public. To cite a few examples: (a) 4,500 hours of USIA-furnished radio programs are being broadcast over some 1,500 Latin American stations per week; (b) some 10,000 words of news and commentary are being sent daily via teletype to all Latin American posts to be made available to the local press; and (c) a weekly 15-minute videotaped show is being televised regularly in 42 cities of 18 Latin American countries, with an estimated 10 million viewers.

In addition to this mass approach, USIA has greatly expanded its efforts to make contact with special groups such as labor, student bodies, and intellectual and cultural elite who are the priority targets of the Communist efforts. The Department of Defense is also making anti-Castro and anti-Communist material available to the armed forces in these countries for use in troop information and education programs.

A gage of the success of our efforts to discredit and isolate the Cuban regime is to be found in the inability of the extreme left to organize anti-American public demonstrations of any significant proportions during the critical days of the missile crisis. One is reminded of the oft-repeated boast of the regime of how the hemisphere would rise in defense of Cuba if measures were taken against it. The record shows otherwise. Only in Bolivia and Uruguay were popular demonstrations of any size mounted and only in Venezuela were there any effective sabotage efforts. Minor protest meetings, student marches, and bombings were reported from other countries, but were regarded even by the Communists themselves as failures in terms of generating popular opposition to the action of the United States.

<sup>10</sup> See *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962*, pp. 408-410.

United States internal security programs, it should be made clear at the outset, are only undertaken at the request of the Latin American governments and can only be a modest addition to their own efforts. They and their peoples must decide what to do and do it, must sometimes kill and be killed, for this is a battle to the death.

Whereas the problem for the United States in strengthening Latin American cooperation toward hemispheric security had, until the advent of the Castro movement, been largely one of developing the capability of the Latin American countries to make a contribution to collective defense, the primary problem has now become the maintenance of internal law and order against Communist-inspired violence.

It became apparent in 1960, with the avowed intention of the Castro regime to promote the overthrow of Latin American governments by indirect aggression and subversion, that the security of nearly every government in the hemisphere would be jeopardized, in varying degrees.

In anticipation that many countries would be confronted with Communist-inspired disorders, terrorism, sabotage, and possibly guerrilla operations, a careful and intensive assessment was made by the United States, in cooperation with the countries, of the potential security threat to each country, with the view to the immediate development and implementation of United States military assistance and training programs reoriented to this new danger. Where critical deficiencies in the capability of local security forces were found, we thus were able to respond rapidly to requests to provide appropriate materiel, training, and services under our military assistance and public safety programs to make up such deficiencies.

This assistance is being provided for the control of Communist-inspired civil disturbances, for vigilance and control of movements of subversives and arms inside those countries and across their borders, and for the maintenance of observation and patrol of rural areas for detection and dispersion of guerrilla movements.

During the past 2 years increased emphasis has been placed on training selected Latin American military personnel in riot control, counter-guerrilla operations and tactics, intelligence and counterintelligence, public information, psychological warfare, counterinsurgency, and other subjects which will contribute to the maintenance of public order and the support of constitutional governments. These courses are given at United States military schools at Fort Gulick, Canal Zone, and at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

In assessing the internal security situation in Latin America, we found that the civil police forces in many of the countries wanted assistance in police administration, training, and operational techniques and particularly required greater mobility and more adequate systems of communications, largely related to riot control and other threats to public order. Consequently, the public safety program, which is an integral part of the AID [Agency for International Development] program, is designed to meet these requests.

In this connection, a regional Inter-American Police Academy was established last year in the Canal Zone, to which we invite selected

members of Latin American civil police forces for training in organization, administration, riot control, records, and investigations.

Closely allied to and an integral part of our internal security programs are civic action programs which are designed to contribute to economic and social development and to establish a better rapport between the forces of order and the civilian population. If the Latin American military and public safety forces are to win popular support for the measures that may be necessary to curb such violence, they must establish themselves in the public mind as a constructive, economically responsible element in the national life.

In essence, our programs are designed to assist the Latin American countries to develop the capability to insure the stability and internal security which are necessary for carrying the Alliance for Progress forward.

As I noted at the outset, the struggle against extracontinental subversion is not a new experience for the inter-American system. The problem arose during World War II with the activities of Axis agents. To help the governments deal with it, the Third Meeting of Foreign Ministers (Rio de Janeiro, 1942) established the Emergency Advisory Committee for Political Defense.<sup>50</sup> This Committee functioned until the end of the war, rendering a most useful service to the inter-American community by assisting the member governments to identify centers of Axis propaganda, espionage, and subversive activities and to develop suitable control measures.

The danger of international communism has been a topic of discussion and action in major inter-American forums from the outset of the cold war. Beginning with the Ninth Inter-American Conference in 1948 to the present, the OAS has demonstrated a steadily growing preoccupation over this threat and readiness to assist the governments to deal with it.

I shall not attempt in this presentation to trace the history of OAS action against the subversive activities of international communism. A good résumé is contained in the Initial General Report of the Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCCS),<sup>51</sup> a copy of which was given to your staff last week.

At Punta del Este last year the Foreign Ministers verified, to use the wording of Resolution I, "that the subversive offensive of communist governments, their agents and the organizations which they control, has increased in intensity."

Concerning this offensive they said:

The purpose of this offensive is the destruction of democratic institutions and the establishment of totalitarian dictatorships at the service of extracontinental powers. The outstanding facts in this intensified offensive are the declarations set forth in official documents of the directing bodies of the international communist movement, that one of its principal objectives is the establishment of communist regimes in the underdeveloped countries and in Latin America; and

<sup>50</sup> For text of Resolution XVII of the Final Act, see the Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 7, 1942, p. 128. [Footnote in source text.]

<sup>51</sup> Text in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962*, pp. 381-386.

the existence of a Marxist-Leninist government in Cuba which is publicly aligned with the doctrine and foreign policy of the communist powers.<sup>52</sup>

I want to note that this assessment was unanimously approved, with the sole exception of the Cuban delegation.

Based on this finding the Foreign Ministers established OAS procedures for assisting the governments to meet the challenge. They directed the Council of the OAS:

. . . to maintain all necessary vigilance, for the purpose of warning against any acts of aggression, subversion, or other dangers to peace and security, or the preparation of such acts, resulting from the continued intervention of Sino-Soviet powers in this hemisphere, and to make recommendations to the governments of the member states with regard thereto.<sup>53</sup>

At the same time they made provision for the establishment of the SCCS, composed of experts on security matters, to advise the Council and the member governments, upon request, on technical problems in this field.

The SCCS was organized last spring and has formally met in three series of sessions since that time: to prepare an initial general report on Communist subversive activities, to advise the Dominican Government on how to deal with Communist subversion, and to assist in the preparation of studies on subversion for the Council. The Council meanwhile has established a special committee of its own, composed of governmental representatives, to carry out its vigilance responsibilities.<sup>54</sup> Both groups in recent weeks have been working together on special studies requested by the Foreign Ministers at their informal meeting in Washington last October 2-3.

At this informal meeting of Foreign Ministers, considerable time was devoted to the problem of subversion, as is reflected in the communique issued at the end of the meeting.<sup>55</sup> The Foreign Ministers found that at the present juncture the most urgent of the problems confronting the hemisphere was "the Sino-Soviet intervention in Cuba as an attempt to convert the island into an armed base for Communist penetration of the Americas and subversion of the democratic institutions." They expressed the desire that in the ideological struggle against communism "the resources and methods inherent in the democratic system should be mobilized to bring the peoples to realize fully the difference between totalitarianism and democracy." They also agreed "that it is necessary for the countries, in accordance with their laws and constitutional precepts, to intensify measures to prevent agents and groups of international communism from carrying on their activities of a subversive nature." In this connection they asked that studies be made in the three areas where Cuba appeared to be concentrating its effort: the transfer of funds to other American Republics for subversive purposes, the flow of subversive propaganda, and the utilization of Cuba as a base for training in subversive activities. I

<sup>52</sup> Text *ibid.*, pp. 320-322.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 322.

<sup>54</sup> See footnote 37 to doc. III-15, *ante*.

<sup>55</sup> Text in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962*, pp. 301-303.

have earlier described in some detail the scope of Cuban activities in these fields. The SCCS has just completed its preliminary study of these three topics, setting forth its conclusions and making specific recommendations for individual and cooperative action by governments.

The Council's Special Committee received the report in Spanish last Monday. After it has been translated and circulated among all the members of the Council, the United States hopes it will be made public.<sup>56</sup> The Special Committee is scheduled to meet this afternoon to consider this point.

I should add that the SCCS report is a technical study prepared by experts acting in their individual capacity. It is to be used by the Special Committee composed of governmental representatives in the preparation of a report to the Council setting forth recommendations for measures which governments may wish to adopt to strengthen their capacity to counter subversive activities in these three fields.

I also want to mention the fact that the Inter-American Defense Board has established an Inter-American Defense College which began its first course for senior officers from the armed forces of the various American Republics in October 1962.<sup>57</sup> The college is located at Fort McNair. The purpose of the college is to conduct courses of study on the inter-American system and the military, economic, political, and social factors that are essential components to the defense of our free societies.

Before leaving this aspect of the problem I would like to say something about the difficulties in curbing subversive activities. The very nature of clandestine action makes it difficult to deal with. In free societies where subversive elements take advantage of the safeguards of democratic processes and where governments feel themselves inhibited by respect for constitutional norms, the problem is even more complicated. Add to this the lack of adequate administrative machinery and internal security capabilities which exists in many Latin American countries, and you can see the dimensions of the problem. For example, coastlines are extensive and thinly populated and frontiers for the most part run through rugged terrain difficult to patrol. Effective control of clandestine shipments of arms and men becomes a most difficult task under these conditions. Besides, there are plenty of arms available in most countries for a price and no need for special efforts to ship them in. The ease with which money can be transmitted poses a serious problem even for governments with the most elaborate security machinery. Propaganda which comes over the radio can be jammed but only at great expense and effort and even then without complete success. The control of the entry and departure of travelers and surveillance while they are in the country is another task requiring large numbers of trained personnel and substantial funds. I mention this solely to give you some idea of what we and our sister Republics are up against in trying to develop our capacity to

<sup>56</sup> Ante, doc. III-19.

<sup>57</sup> See *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962*, pp. 503-507.

deal with the problem of subversion through individual and collective effort.

At the same time I don't want to leave the impression we have given up. The training in Cuba of party members is a particularly important contribution about which it should be possible to do something. A number of suggestions are made on this matter in the recent SCCS report. While the actions must be taken by our Latin American associates, we will certainly wish to be helpful in any way we can.

So far I have talked about U.S. and OAS programs to deal directly with the subversive effort. It would be a mistake to close without a few words on the Alliance for Progress.

In the critical last week of October, when we confronted the Soviet Union bluntly and directly over the missiles in Cuba, the Finance Ministers of the 20 member countries of the Alliance for Progress met in Mexico City.<sup>58</sup> President Kennedy sent a message to that conference which established the clear and direct relationship of their work to our and the hemisphere's security. He said to the alliance conferees:

Your meeting is a vital reminder that the central task of this generation of Americans is not merely the avoidance of conflict. It is the construction of a new community of American nations in which all our citizens can live not only free from fear but full of hope. . . . Just as the unyielding determination of today is essential if we are to realize the future promise of the Alliance for Progress, the future success of the Alliance for Progress will be the final vindication of the resolute course we are taking today.

The alliance was not undertaken as a response to Castro. But I do not think there is any doubt that the threat of Castroism gave us a sense of urgency about the economic and social underdevelopment of Latin America and the resultant political tensions and dangers that we did not have before. We have engaged in this program because it is right and because it is in our national interest to live in a world of independent and secure countries. By doing so, however, we also seek to provide for Latin America a democratic alternative to Castro communism, reflecting another statement by President Kennedy: "peaceful evolution proves impossible, violent revolutions will be inevitable."

Theoretically, we could put vast amounts of arms and riot equipment into Latin American hands today to stamp out rebellion and shoot down the Communist leaders and followers. But in whose hands would we put these arms? How can we be sure that the revolutionaries of today will not be the rioters tomorrow? What good are arms and security controls in a permanently unstable society?

In practice, we are providing aid to our sister Republics in public safety and antisubversion efforts, conscious of the fact that these efforts are meaningful only in the framework of a longer term program. That program is the alliance. We are helping our sister Republics to maintain order and strengthen democratic institutions so the fruits of the alliance may have a chance to ripen. Some of them ripen fast—schools, health centers, pure-water systems, low-income homes, schools

<sup>58</sup> See *Ibid.*, pp. 508-510.

feeding, farm-to-market roads. Others take time to produce results: new industries, road and rail networks, modernized agricultural economies. We do the first kind, again, to make possible the second kind. What we aim at is, over the next 10 years, to develop skills, attitudes, and material foundations on the basis of which Latin America can go forward to self-sustaining growth. What we aim at, simultaneously, is the production of sufficient evidence for a large enough number of people that our way works so as to deter them from following the false but alluring promises of the Castroites and Communists.

Are we succeeding? We cannot yet answer this question with certainty. What we do know is that we are getting under the Castroites' and the Communists' skin. The Alliance for Progress is a constant object of their scorn and their attacks. If that be a measure of the threat it poses to their goals, then we have reason to be hopeful about its appeal to the peoples of Latin America and its chances of success. Let me quote just a few examples.

Peiping Radio on August 25th last year quoted the Mexican Communist organization which calls itself the National Liberation Movement as follows: "The Alliance for Progress is nothing but a hoax which could not deceive the people." It goes on to say: "Nobody can arrest the advance of history, whether by violence or threat, propaganda or the 20 billion dollars, a United States promise connected with the Alliance for Progress program."

Cuban Communist leader Blas Roca in an article in *Cuba Socialista* in May of last year mentioned the alliance no less than six times in two pages. He says the alliance "gives no adequate or effective answer to the cry of the peoples of Latin America." The reason for this, says the Cuban Communist chief, is that it will not, and I quote again, "liberate Latin America from Yankee rule, but . . . strengthen it." The burden of his article, translated into plain language, is that the alliance would create a satisfactory and healthy relationship between the United States and Latin America and thus must be fought like poison by the Communists.

Castro's hope for the defeat of the alliance was expressed in an interview with some Western reporters on June 1st, when he said that the American economy cannot afford the alliance. He said, hopefully no doubt, and I quote from a Reuters dispatch in the *New York Times*: "They [the Americans] have neither the gold reserves nor the organization nor the men to make it work."

We do not need to concern ourselves too much with challenges thrown out by Fidel Castro. The challenge we face is self-imposed, not only by us in the United States but by all 20 alliance members. It is to end hunger, disease, and illiteracy in Latin America, to make these Republics a better place to live for their people and thus to make the hemisphere a better place to live for the United States. And it is a point to remember that Castro, Khrushchev, and Mao Tse-tung would rejoice if we gave up on the premise of the Alliance for Progress. They are right, of course, in being concerned about the alliance, not only for the long-term future, but more immediately. For one factor in the unanimous agreement in the hemisphere on what to do about the

missiles and in the failure of the Communist program of protests was the new hope of peaceful change brought by the alliance and the new view of the U.S. resulting from our leadership in this effort.

We see the alliance as much more than a program of economic and social progress. We see it as a political and ideological program as well, depending for its success as much on the development of Latin America's human resources, the reshaping of public and leadership attitudes and institutions as on the building of roads, factories, and hospitals.

The Charter of Punta del Este<sup>\*\*</sup> calls for more than a collection of separate projects paid for by American public funds. It envisages the modernization of society throughout Latin America. This includes the harnessing of the intensive craving for a national renaissance to the constructive goals set forth in the charter. It means the development of wise and responsible political leadership, the broadening of opportunities for the increasingly frustrated and impatient young generation, particularly in the universities, and the channelling of vast intellectual and physical energies into the pursuit of national strength and independence in each member country of the alliance.

The building of a stronger and broader economic base must go hand in hand with the development of an open and vigorous society in which there is room at the top and near the top for all those whose talents and dedication entitle them to play a more meaningful and self-fulfilling role in the conduct of their nations' affairs. If Latin America succeeds in this quest, if its youth finds the opportunity to plot solutions instead of revolutions, to demonstrate results instead of just demonstrating, the death knell will have sounded for the pessimism and the nihilism that are Castro's most valuable assets.

The pursuit of these objectives also entails a new dimension for our own Latin American policy and the resetting of sights on the part of all Americans, official and private, active in the region and in hemisphere affairs. This reorientation of our own attitudes is not an intellectual exercise. It is a requirement for the successful conduct of our new Latin American policy. Our own destiny is inextricably bound up with the development of a hemisphere-wide renewal which is long overdue. The alternative is a series of convulsions whose consequences cannot be foreseen but which are more likely to serve the objectives of our adversaries than the interests of Latin America and the United States.

In this sense, the Alliance for Progress is a policy of both national and hemispheric security which, regardless of the frustrations and disappointments we may experience, must be pursued steadfastly until the common goal is achieved.

In concluding this presentation I want to draw a few tentative conclusions, tentative because we are dealing with unusually unpredictable forces:

1. The peoples and governments of the Americas face a serious problem in Communist subversion. Assessments of the degree of danger

<sup>\*\*</sup> Text in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961*, pp. 395-400.

to particular countries will vary, though no country now seems likely to succumb in the foreseeable future. No one can deny, however, that it is a real and continuing problem as far as the peace and security of the hemisphere as a whole is concerned. Further, we cannot disregard the fact that terror and violence create conditions which make it far more difficult for public or private enterprise to achieve the economic and social progress essential to the ultimate defeat of subversion by the success of the Alliance for Progress.

2. During the months ahead we may well witness a step-up of the tactics of violence as the Communists, impatient to score successes to recoup their prestige in Cuba and in the hemisphere, resort to terrorism, sabotage, and guerrilla activities in an attempt to get publicity, unseat governments, and seize power.

3. The nature of subversive action places the primary responsibility on each country to adopt necessary legislation, establish required administrative machinery and develop sufficient internal security forces to meet any situation which may arise. But such formal steps are not enough. Will and skill and courage are also required. And ultimately governments can only succeed if by their policies for promoting political, economic, and social development they are able to command the active support of the great majority of their peoples.

4. It is no less true, however, that the effectiveness of the measures taken individually can be measurably increased or decreased by the degree to which the governments, including the United States, cooperate with one another, bilaterally or in larger groups like the OAS, sharing resources, experience, and intelligence.

5. Without being complacent, we in the United States can derive certain satisfaction that as a result of actions of the United States and other American governments, working individually and collectively, some headway is being made to reduce the influence and capabilities of Cuba and the bloc and in controlling local subversive activities of all kinds in each country. Current United States actions may be summarized as reducing the appeal and capabilities of the Cuban regime, spreading knowledge of what a Castro Communist regime does for a people's freedom and well-being, providing equipment and training to Latin American military and police forces to deal with riots and guerrilla actions, working through the OAS to stimulate individual and collective action on the problem, and through the Alliance for Progress helping our partners attack the basic discontent on which subversion feeds.

6. The activities of all U.S. agencies must continue to be vigorous and be closely integrated into a single program which, in turn, is appropriately related to the particular problems and programs of each country on the one hand, and the OAS on the other.

7. Further deterioration of the prestige and influence of the present regime in Cuba, and its eventual replacement by a government freely chosen by the Cuban people, will contribute materially to reducing the threat but will not eliminate it. To do this, we must all work continuously on many fronts, positive and negative, individually and

together, until the strength of our free democratic system to meet the highest needs and aspirations of the peoples is unmistakably proven to all and the Alliance for Progress has achieved its goals.